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Ethnic economy and ethnic entrepreneurship1 
"Ethnic economy" refers to ethnic self-employed and employers and their co-ethnic 
employees. It exists when an ethnic minority creates its own private economy sector.2 "Ethnic 
entrepreneurship" refers to those entrepreneurs who a) belong to an ethnic minority; b) have 
to rely on support from their ethnic community to do business, whereby this support can be 
informal (friends, relations) or formal (a network of ethnic institutions and organizations), and 
c) use ethnic resources in their businesses. Light and Rosenstein define ethnic resources as 
"socio-cultural features of the whole group which co-ethnic entrepreneurs actively utilize in 
business or from which their business passively benefits."3 These include ethnic culture, 
ethnic networks, employees and management from the same ethnic group; business relations 
with other members of the same nationality, etc.; but also ethnic identity and trust as social 
and symbolic capital.4 Ethnic entrepreneurship also requires business to be done in a limited 
environment, whether territorial or by area of business. 
 
Though there are various theories that discuss the social cause for the mergence of ethnic 
entrepreneurship one could argue in our case that self-employment results from the desire for 
individual autonomy and independence, and therefore enables the Yi minority to evade Han 
control.5 Ethnic entrepreneurship would then be viewed as an ethnic departure from the Han-
dominated economy. In fact multiple explanations are necessary for ethnic entrepreneurship: 
they need to include on the one hand traditional ideas (disposition towards business and 
business thinking), and on the other hand situation-dependent conditions (access to resources, 
poverty, unemployment), institutional circumstances, social components and incentives. 
 
The Yi are the sixth largest ethnic minority in China. There are about 8 million Yi people 
living in China, primarily in the south-western provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou, 
                                                           
1 This article presents findings of a research project into entrepreneurs of Yi nationality in Liangshan Yi 
Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province. The project was carried out in co-operation with the Institute for 
Nationalities Studies of the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, and was sponsored by the German 
Volkswagen Foundation. Field research (with questionnaires and qualitative interviews) was conducted in 10 
out of the 17 counties that constitute the prefecture. 
2 Ivan Light, Stavros Karageorgis, "The Ethnic Economy", in: Neil Smelser, Richard Swedberg (eds.) The 
Handbook of Economic Sociology (New York: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 647, 648. 
3 Ivan Light, Carolyn Rosenstein, “Expanding the Interaction Theory of Entrepreneurship,” in: Alejandro Portes 
(ed.), The Economic Sociology of Immigration. Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship (New 
York: Basic Books, 1995), p. 171. 
4 Pierre Bourdieu, Praktische Vernunft. Zur Theorie des Handelns (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1998), p.175.; for 
details, Ivan Light, Ethnic Enterprise in America: Business and Welfare Among Chinese, Japanese and Blacks 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). 
5 The Han (Chinese) are the largest nationality with a population of more than 1.1 billion people. 
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with a small proportion in Guangxi. Up to the mid-1950s, the Yi in general, and particularly 
the groups living in the Liangshan Mountains in the south of Sichuan province who prefer to 
call themselves Nuosu, to a large degree had managed to maintain their social, political and 
cultural identity. Traditionally the Yi are not organized in tribes, but rather in clans and 
lineages which frequently were engaged in clan wars and feuds. 
 
In comparison with the national level as well as with other minority areas, Liangshan 
Prefecture counts among the poorest and least developed regions of China. This is particularly 
true if one disregards the city of Xichang, the industrial and cultural centre with a 
predominantly Han population. Twelve of the sixteen counties in Liangshan Prefecture as 
well as 390 towns and townships in those 12 counties at the end of the 1990s were officially 
counted and registered as "poor counties". In 1992 "poor" meant that those counties had a per 
capita income of less than 200 Yuan per year (about US $ 25). At that time more than half of 
the Yi in Liangshan were counted as "very poor" i.e. they lived under the poverty line and had 
a yearly income of less than 200 Yuan.6 In 2001 the criteria for poverty was an average, 
annual cash income per capita of less than 1,000 Yuan and less than 800 kg grain per year and 
capita. 
 
In the first half of 1999 the "individual sector" (with less than 8 employees) in the prefecture 
comprised 54,169 businesses with 77,689 employees; the larger private sector (with more 
than 7 employees) had 888 businesses with 16,231 employees.7 This shows that already by 
the end of 1998 a significant proportion of employees on a payroll were working in the 
private sector. Most of the private companies are small firms in the (individual economic) 
sectors small industry and crafts, transport, construction, catering (restaurants, hostelries etc.), 
trade and other service industries (repair, computer services, entertainment). Especially the 
private rural industries have developed into being a pillar of industry. Larger companies are 
                                                           
6 Jike Quri, "Lun Liangshan Yizu pinkun yuanyin, xianzhuang ji fupin duice" ("Reasons and current situation of 
the poverty of the Yi in Liangshan and poverty alleviation policies"), in: Liangshan Yixue (Yi Studies of 
Liangshan), 10/1999, pp.39; Qubishimei, Yang Liping, "Liangshan zhou pinkun wenti de duice yanjiu" 
("Studies on the Problem of Poverty in Liangshan Prefecture and Ways of Solution"), in: Liangshan Minzu 
Yanjiu (Liangshan Nationalities Studies) 1992, p.33. More on the Yi: Stevan Harrell, Ways of Being Ethnic in 
Southwest China (Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 2001); S. Harrell (ed.), Perspectives on the 
Yi of Southwest China (Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 2001); on economic and social 
development of Liangshan prefecture: Thomas Heberer, "Nationalities Conflict and Ethnicity in the People’s 
Republic of China, with Special Reference to the Yi in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture," in: S. 
Harrell (ed.), Perspectives on the Yi, pp.214-237. 
7 According to informations given by the Bureau for Administration of Industry and Commerce of the Liangshan 
Autonomous Prefecture in Xichang, 24 August 1999. On private entrepreneurship in China in general: Thomas 
Heberer, Private Entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam. Social and Political Functioning of Strategic Groups 
(Leiden: Brill, 2003). 
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emerging steadily but only slowly. The proportion of businesses belonging to people of Yi 
ethnicity is small, particularly in the larger private sector. According to data from the first half 
of 1999, the statistics concerning members of ethnic minorities in Liangshan (almost entirely 
Yi), engaged in the private sector (individual and private economy) were merely 9.2% of all 
businesses (5,091 out of 55,057). 
 
The following contribution goes into the effects of Yi entrepreneurship on the social 
structures of Yi society, particularly the clans and their changing role and function. We adress 
central components of social resources and behavior of Yi entrepreneurs like ethnic resources; 
moral obligations towards one’s clan or lineage; social impacts in the form of entrepreneurs 
becoming clan or lineage headmen; the growing significance of non-kinship relations, and 
processes of individualization. We conclude that entrepreneurs on the one side are still 
embedded in a framework of social morality and obligations, yet, on the other side, impact 
upon the change of the social structure of Yi society. 
 
Ethnic resources 
 
Strong ties 1: the levels of clan, family and kinship 
 
Yi are embedded in groups based on descent (clans) whose members are derived from 
common ancestors; these clans bear the same family name, regard themselves as blood-
related, and are as a rule genuinely so. In the rural areas the members of a clan mostly live in 
one location and form stable units with common spheres of economic activity, cults and 
solidarity. The clan is segmented into lineages that constitute the branches of descent from a 
common ancestor, and plays a particularly important role in Yi society both as an economic 
unit and a source of solidarity. Its members commit themselves to the same obligations as 
close kin, such as the duty to mutual help and support. A clan may encompass tens of 
thousands of people e.g. the Shaga clan in Ganluo County which comprises more than 20,000 
people and ten lineages (fen zhi). 
 
Belonging to a clan is one of the most important ethnic resources. Amongst such resources 
should be counted clan and lineage networks, human resources from the same clan likewise 
the same ethnic group and guanxi to Yi cadres above all to those from the same clan. The clan 
represents not only capital of a cultural or economic kind, but also political, social and 
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cognitive capital as well as connections inside networks. The economic dimension moves 
more into the foreground when a clan or its members possess financial resources that would 
be necessary for founding companies, or to organize economic activities based on the division 
of labor. Clan membership is proving to be an ethnic resource that is gaining in significance, 
and which finds expression in a shared language. 
 
The clan can also be classified as social or in our case ethnic capital. The term social capital 
refers first of all to the structures of relations of individuals located within both families and 
communities (e.g. networks, social relations such as guanxi etc.). Portes and Sensenbrenner 
have sub-divided social capital as related to economic behavior into four major elements: (a) 
value introjection i.e. the moral side of economic transactions that are determined by value 
imperatives which have accumulated in the process of socialization, and become consensual 
belief; (b) reciprocity transactions, the package of mutual social duties and obligations; (c) 
bounded solidarity, norm-oriented behavior, moral obligation, and situational reactive 
sentiments within one’s group; and (d) enforcable trust, norm-driven obligations that generate 
confidence within a group whereas rewards and sanctions are linked to group trust.8  
 
These four factors which are generally embedded in social relationships, can also be 
transferred to the ethnic context. In the case of the Yi one may speak of particularistic ethnic 
capital, because it does not refer to the Yi as an ethnic community but rather in the first place 
only to a section of them, namely the clans. Decisive in that is that each individual knows 
how he/she has to behave to other clan members. But since these values (patterns of 
reciprocity, norms, solidarity and behavior) are equally binding for all Yi clans, one can 
perceive them too as markers of ethnicity. They have been internalized by every member of 
the group and can be fundamentally distinguished from the patterns that the Han display, and 
they serve in this way to separate the Yi off from the Han. In this way they generate symbolic 
and cultural capital that serves the maintenance of their own identity and the protection of the 
group. 
 
Under conditions of institutional and legal uncertainty, entrepreneurs accrue capital and 
recruit a working force and administrative personnel very often from their own families or 
clans; for external processes they count on family members who have access to the resources 
                                                           
8 Alejandro Portes, Julia Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of 
Economic Action", in: Mark Granovetter, Richard Swedberg (eds.), The Sociology of Economic Life (Boulder 
and Oxford: Westview, 2001), pp.114-116. 
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needed. The factors of trust and mutual help are important standpoints. Clans are, in the words 
of Luhmann "disappointment resistant" (enttäuschungsfest) i.e. their expectations of behavior 
acquire norms.9 In general, lineage or clan relationships in Yi society play – just as they did 
before – a paramount role, and are based primarily on trust. Members of a clan are considered 
to be persons with whom collective responsibility, bounded solidarity, trust and loyalty exists, 
and economically seen, when somebody is given a job from whom a high degree of 
responsibility and loyalty is expected. Such relationships of trust can be made use of in order 
to gain access to a labor force, credits and loans, customers and suppliers. 
 
Kinship relationships possess internal and external function areas. Inside a company this 
refers to the employment of and cooperation with members of the family or kin (clan 
members). In almost all of the Yi companies surveyed by us, members of the lineage and kin 
played an important role, to some extent all leading company positions were in the hands of 
such persons. Many rural enterprises in Liangshan could be classified as "clan companies" 
(jiazu qiye). This refers on the one hand to enterprises whose ownership or operation might be 
attributed to a clan and/or are run in the interest of the respective clan.10 On the other hand 
clan enterprises are those where the employees or a significant section of them are members 
of the entrepreneur’s clan, or where at least the key functions of a company are in the hands of 
the members of one’s clan. 
 
As far as my survey is concerned, more than one quarter of the investigated enterprises 
(25.9%) could be classified as such companies. Amongst the respondents interviewed there 
were different opinions current about the employment and participation of members of the 
lineage and kin in their own companies. Many entrepreneurs welcomed such involvement, 
and argued that it was risky and indeed even dangerous to place one’s trust in people who 
were not family members. In difficult times kin workers would work without payment if 
necessary, and they were reliable, obedient (ting hua), and above all a relationship of trust 
existed. Even if paid best rates, argued one entrepreneur, outsiders were seldom truly reliable.  
 
Yet, not all entrepreneurs believed in such arguments. Other entrepreneurs were of the 
opinion that with increasing size and modernization of a company, the kinship factor was 
gradually diminishing in favor of the employment of non-kin members. This is because 
                                                           
9 Niklas Luhmann, Funktion und Folgen formaler Organisation (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1999), p.56. 
10 Yao Xiantao, Wang Lianjuan, Zhongguo jiazu qiye. Xianzhuang, wenti yu duice (China’s clan enterprises. 
Current situation, problems, and policies) (Beijing: Qiye guanli chubanshe, 2002), pp.10, 11 and 56-59. 
  6
familial bonding and obligations often impair company processes since criticism or making 
kin redundant for working badly or inefficiently may lead to massive, intra-familial 
confrontations. Family members are often less controllable or guidable, and irrational patterns 
may lead to conflicts.11 Some entrepreneurs believed that members of one's clan and kin 
should not work in their own companies since this commonly led to problems in the course of 
the company’s work and to differences of opinion. Those entrepreneurs argued that one could 
not measure members of the family and kin by the performance of a normal employee. One 
had to behave in the appropriate way; and it was difficult to criticize or to transfer them they 
thought. So some entrepreneurs had paid off members of the family and kin network; they 
gave them a sum for the founding of their own companies, and in this way were able to 
complete the separation in a harmonious manner. 
 
Furthermore it has to be decided from case to case. Under certain circumstances such as an 
environment marked by a high degree of political, legal or social insecurity, it may be that a 
family company based on the factor of trust is able to operate more flexibly and securely than 
others. Wong has argued that a deficiency of trust in the system is a major reason why 
entrepreneurs prefer family or clan enterprises.12 Moreover, employees who exist in a close 
relationship with the entrepreneur due to familial obligations are more prepared to continue 
working even when a company finds itself in economic difficulties. A lack of confidence in 
the government contributes to the success of family companies.13 
 
In companies in which the transaction costs in some circumstances of employment of kin and 
clan members are too high (e.g. in sectors with fixed specifications concerning working times 
such as the construction industry, or in mining in which accidents often occur which – as 
mentioned – may lead to internal clan conflicts), entrepreneurs develop evasive strategies, and 
employ people from outside of the clan or perhaps Han. If and when the transaction costs 
caused by non-employment of clan members are too high, for instance at companies that are 
set up inside the territory of their own clan, or in which resources from their own clan are 
required (cheap labor, capital, raw materials etc.), then entrepreneurs take on clan members 
                                                           
11 Li Fang made a similar observation: Li Fang, The Social Organization of Entrepreneurship: The Rise of 
Private Firms in China (Diss.) (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1998), pp.168-172. 
12 Tony Fu-Lai Yu, Firms, governments and economic change. An entrepreneurial perspective (Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2001), p.54; Siu-Lun Wong, "Modernization and Chinese Cultural Traditions in 
Hong Kong," in: H. Tai (ed.), Confucianism and Economic Development: An Oriental Alternative 
(Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1991), p.15. 
13 J. Ray Bowen, David C. Rose "On the Absence of Privately Owned, Publicly Traded Corporations in China: 
The Kirby Puzzle,", in: The Journal of Asian Studies, 2/1998, p.443. 
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for the most part. At the same time, a relationship of trust to kin exists through which 
economic difficulties and legal uncertainties may be compensated for if necessary. 
 
The theme companies based on clans is certainly one which is often and controversially 
discussed in China. Perceived in social-scientific terms, relations of employment based on 
being socially related or on kinship are – like clan companies – generally regarded as being 
disadvantageous for the development of firms. But in the meantime they have been re-
assessed and are no longer seen only as a negative factor; instead their specific advantages are 
underlined. In cases of a crisis or downturn in the business, they reduce company difficulties 
in that the clan employees make e.g. interest-free credits available, do without pay 
temporarily, or due to their trust and loyalty engage themselves more strongly for company 
interests.14 
 
The New Institutional Economics assumes that the existing economic structures should be 
understood less in terms of "traditional", and rather as the intelligent strategy to solve 
problems. The argument runs that through those structures the transaction costs could be 
lowered, and in times of economic and political insecurity the existing trust is more important 
than rational-impersonal relations.15 However, our research shows that this hypothesis is only 
partially true. The advantages of employing kin or clan members such as loyalty, trust, self-
exploitation, selfless commitment to the required work, or more effective social control, have 
to be balanced out in economic terms against numerous disadvantages which have potentially 
very high social costs: the danger of conflict with kin/clan members; the toleration of 
unsatisfactory work so as to avoid conflict; or the discrepancy between existing and required 
abilities.16 
 
But on the other side, family or clan relationships play an important role in acquiring 
investment capital for founding a company. Since private entrepreneurs as a rule hardly have 
                                                           
14 Compare Yao and Wang, Zhongguo jiazu qiye and Huang Xiangyuan, "Jiazu qiye de shengli haishi xiandai 
qiye de shengli?" ("Victory of clan enterprises or of modern enterprises?"), in: Zhongguo Qiyejia (China’s 
Entrepreneurs), 4/2000, pp. 28-30; different opinions are expressed in Wang Yang, "Jiazu qiye yinggai 
tichang" ("Clan enterprises should be promoted"), in: Zhongguo gongshang bao (Newspaper for China’s 
Industry and Commerce), 16 October 2002 and Huang Yan, "Jiazu qiye jianjian luowu" ("Clan enterprises 
should gradually retreat"), in: Zhongguo gongshang bao, 16 October 2002. 2002. 
15 Cf. Mark S. Granovetter, "The Economic Sociology of Firms and Entrepreneurs," in: Alejandro Portes, The 
Economic Sociology, pp. 129, 130; T. Fu-Lai Yu, Firms, governments, pp.58, 59. 
16 Compare also Hans-Günter Krüsselberg, "Ökonomik der Familie", in: Klaus Heinemann (ed.), Soziologie 
wirtschaftlichen Handelns. Sonderheft der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 28 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987), pp.184, 185. Employment of family or clan members who are less 
industrious or lazy, is evaluated socially as positive behavior, as it enables the respective persons to become 
fully accepted members of their group. 
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access to bank credits, members of the family and kin represent an important source of credit. 
This may take different forms: clan members who themselves are entrepreneurs provide 
credits; members enjoying good relations with banks and credit institutes support 
entrepreneurs within their clan to acquire such credits. Insofar as we find solvent 
entrepreneurs within a clan, a system of mutual support may exist. Clans or lineages 
themselves may even to some extent act as guarantors. This is not only the case for bank 
credits, but also for private credits. In these cases the honor of the clan constitutes the basis 
for trust and creditworthiness. We were even told by one entrepreneur that should a German 
company provide investment for his enterprise, his clan would act as the guarantor for that. 
 
Moreover, familial or clan relationships play an important role too in contexts outside the 
company especially when family members and kin discharge leading functions in state or 
party organizations. This also facilitates the access to resources, investment capital, markets 
and information. 
 
As well as the formation of networks of entrepreneurs within individual clans (whether for 
supply, delivery, credits or subsidies, or the acquiring of customers), sets of clan-internal 
companies for production and marketing come into being. For the latter one group of people 
would found a production firm, others a transport company that would carry the manufactured 
goods to the surrounding cities, and yet another would open a firm in the urban area so as to 
sell the products. 
 
The clan is at the same time a political resource because even nowadays legal problems with 
the police and the justice system can be sorted out by means of the clan. This takes place 
informally because officially and from a governmental viewpoint the clan is not an acceptable 
form of organization. But it possesses a bridging function towards the state and takes on tasks 
such as mediation and social control. 
 
Parallel to this trend, new clan networks appear to be developing somewhat in the form of 
clan associations (jiazhi xiehui). In one case an entrepreneur called this association into life 
with the inclusion of clan members who were functionaries at the county, prefecture or even 
province level. He argued that in such associations it had been shown that the obligations to 
the clan were more binding than those to the party. Above all, he emphasized that these 
relationships were based on equality since all clan members had equal rights. At the annual 
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"torch festival" (the most important festival of the Yi) every year there is a "small gathering" 
of all members, every three years are "large gathering". The costs are shared by all those 
taking part. Thus clan associations constitute a classic ethnic network. 
 
Migration processes and a growing degree of social mobility have led to such association 
forming, so as to protect the clan and its functions. To some extent clan members have begun 
to be organized according to location; e.g. in the prefectural capital Xichang there is a branch 
association of the Luohong clan with 32 families. The association has a "managing director" 
(guanli renyuan), who is responsible for organization, cohesion or team spirit, contacts, 
information and finances. Costs are shared through levies for the carrying out of clan 
business. These groups should also be assessed as an attempt to resist the long-term, 
weakening of the clan and reciprocal obligations of its members due to the geographical 
and/or social distance between them. 
 
On the one hand those associations could be defined as a kind of interest organization based 
on clan interests, particularly as there are no other representative organizations of the Yi in 
existence, and – due to rigid state control - other forms of organization are currently not 
available. Yet the existence of a jiazhi xiehui reveals that informal organizations emerge, 
filling the organizational vacuum of autonomous interest groups. 
 
Other ethnic resources 
 
Social relationships and networks are also important ethnic resources. After all informal 
relationships between basically equal social actors constitute networks – whereas if the actors 
are unequal, one should speak of patronage. Network relationships are based on the elements 
of cooperation and loyalty. Creation and preservation of confidence form the most important 
factors in successful networks.17 They connect in them not only individuals and groups of 
individuals but also institutions as well as clusters in which the players in a network are 
active. As a result a network extends far beyond the element of individuals. Furthermore, 
individuals are members of different networks, and networks are connected with each other 
through individuals. 
                                                           
17 Jennifer Frances, Rosalind Levacic, Jeremy Mitchell, Grahame Thompson, "Introduction," in: 
Thompson,Frances, Levacic, Mitchell (eds.), Markets, Hierarchies and Networks. The Coordination of Social 
Life (London, London et al.: Sage, 1991), pp.14-18; Pat Reese, Howard E. Aldrich, "Entrepreneurial Networks 
and Business Performance," in: Sue Birley, Ian C. MacMillan (eds.), Entrepreneurship in a Global Context 
(London, New York: Routledge 1997), pp. 124-130. 
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In relation to the entrepreneurs we interviewed, such relationships and networks have 
principally the following functions: 
 
• On the economic level the preservation and exchange of resources, goods and services 
as well as cooperation in the sphere of production; attaining economic advantages in 
the structuring of a company (easier access to markets, credits, information, raw 
materials, state sector commissions, tax remission or reduction) through social 
connections to important decision makers; 
• the ensuring of influence on the political level and pushing through of business-
oriented interests; gaining political advantages (obtaining public positions), party 
membership, getting round political restrictions); defense against disadvantages 
(positive influencing of local functionaries, avoidance of excessive restrictions); 
• on the cognitive level the strengthening of identities; networks provide too for 
cognitive and affective support through the network members, strengthen in this way 
the identities of their members, and ensure their recognition inside and outside the 
group. 
• on the communicative level the exchange of information; 
• on the normative level specific expectations on the basis of various commonalities. 
 
Here one finds again the four factors value introjection, reciprocity transactions, bounded 
solidarity, and enforceable trust, because ethnic networks presuppose these markers of ethnic 
capital so as to be able to operate with any degree of success in the economic sphere. 
 
Portes and Senzenbrenner argue at the same time that compliance with group norms which in 
turn means enforceable trust is stronger under conditions of external discrimination against an 
ethnic group than under more pluralistic and equal terms. Therefore ethnic networks (as, for 
instance, clan associations and networks between entrepreneurs and local officials) play a 
crucial role in the Liangshan counties. On the other hand, if the access to economic resources 
and to social and/or professional advancement outside one’s own group is more promising, or 
if one’s own group is not able to fulfill the expectations of the group members, then the 
cohesion of that community and the observance of community norms will be weakened.18 
 
                                                           
18 Compare Portes/Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and Immigration", p.124. 
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Furthermore amongst the ethnic resources are included access to Yi workers who are less 
costly than Han ones, so far as they are either members of the same clan as the entrepreneurs, 
or people with other personal relationships to them; the Yi workers are prepared to continue 
working without payment in cases of financial problems within a company. Low wages or the 
holding back of wage payments are then accepted because the employer is a member of the 
same clan or the same nationality, relationships which contain a high degree of trust and 
loyalty.  
 
Better guanxi to the local (Yi) bureaucracy likewise constitutes a further ethnic resource of 
the Yi entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs utilize their personal, ethnic and kinship affiliations to 
local cadres to create clientele-like ties. And, in turn, indigenous cadres use their positions to 
create ethnic political machines. 
 
As a result, many Han entrepreneurs held that they were disadvantaged, and the local 
authorities confer advantages on the Yi enterprises. Some Han regarded this as an important 
reason why they wanted to leave the Liangshan area. 
 
 
Ethnic entrepreneurship and moral obligations 
 
Through the economization of Chinese society as well as that of the Yi, and through the 
existence of entrepreneurs, the economic function of the clan and lineage, unlike the social 
function, seems to be on the increase and is becoming more differentiated. The Yi make use 
of their clan and clan networks in order to optimize their business opportunities, and to secure 
advantages in competition with Han entrepreneurs. The new entrepreneurs combine economic 
division of labor within their clan with increasing social provision for their clans. Our study 
among the Yi confirms James Scott's hypothesis that it is expected of members of a clan who 
have become well off that they will share their wealth with other members of the clan or 
village, or support or assist them. This moral obligation, which Scott calls, "the moral 
economy of the peasant",19 has changed very little in Yi society until now. However, as the 
market spreads, Scott expects this moral principle will be called into question by personal 
profit maximization. Correspondingly the principle of mutual help could go into decline. I 
                                                           
19 James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasants. Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven, 
Lonmdon: Yale University Press, 1976). 
  12
shall now examine whether Scott's hypothesis is also true for Yi entrepreneurship. 
 
In respect of the clan, the interviewed Yi entrepreneurs replied with very different opinions 
ranging from it being a burden to an indispensable support. Yi entrepreneurs are subject to 
a considerable onus and obligations by the clan. This was complained about many times 
although the majority cannot shirk those duties. As a result some have decided only to hire 
non-local Yi and to support financially the clan and/or clan members. Where the clans are 
poor and a single or a few entrepreneurs are obliged to subsidize them, the clan quickly 
becomes a strain.  
 
But one can discern different phases of the obligations towards the clan in which transfers by 
the entrepreneur are experienced as being a burden to a greater or lesser extent. In the difficult 
founding and/or early phase of a firm as well as during company crises such transfers are a 
heavy load to be borne, whereas in times of prosperity these payments are all designed to 
contribute to the acceptance and the social prestige of the entrepreneur within the community. 
Trenk has expressed the ambivalence in the sentence, many entrepreneurs experience the 
demands made by their kinship as their undoing: "Your wealth is your ruin," but at the same 
time the challenge of taking on the role of a ‘big man’ within and outside kinship is felt to be 
a more important social factor.20 
 
Where a clan is economically better off and has produced various entrepreneurial 
personalities, then its economic role is stronger and its social prestige greater. Entrepreneurs 
from a clan mutually support each other financially, and in the search for markets. To some 
extent entrepreneurs take over training functions, or build roads and schools for their clan’s 
villages. Cadres provide advantages for entrepreneurs from their own clans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
20 Martin Trenk, "’Dein Reichtum ist dein Ruin’. Zum Stand der Forschung über afrikanische Unternehmer und 
wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung," in: Anthropos, 86 (1991), p.514. 
  13
Table 1 shows in detail what the support of entrepreneurs for their clan consists of:  
Table 1: Assistance to clan by Yi entrepreneurs 
 
Social benefits: in cases of illness, poverty and debt; payments of school fees and financing of post-school education 
Social obligations: Taking over the costs for ritual festivities (family festivities such as marriage/ wedding, 
funerals/funeral services) 
Goods and services for families: Building of new houses, payment of dowries of relatives, financing of motor-bikes, 
cars and electrical devices 
Benefits for the community: Financing of access to drink water and electricity, of TV stations and satellite dishes, 
building schools and hospitals, re-afforestation programs and building roads; taking over costs of drinking water, 
electricity etc. 
Employment and training: employment or training in entrepreneur’s own company, making starting capital available 
for founding companies 
Source: Own survey. 
 
According to what the entrepreneurs stated, the amount of the donation payments per year 
vary depending on the financial power of the firm in question, between a thousand and some 
tens of thousands, or even more than one hundred thousand Yuan. Thus the benefits to the 
community require as a rule expenditure of some hundreds of thousands of Yuan. But not 
only monetary contributions count amongst the costs of community solidarity, but also that of 
kin members who continuously try to obtain jobs and loans. Geerts has already pointed out in 
his study of Bali that entrepreneurial success, "will lead to a higher level of welfare for the 
organic community as a whole," whereby massive obstacles are put in the way of the 
expansion of entrepreneurial activity.21 
 
A series of Yi entrepreneurs sought Yi personnel from outside of the clan and/or outside the 
county so as to evade the social obligations towards clan members whom they might employ. 
One entrepreneur argued: "Amongst those from elsewhere I can pick out the most able. From 
clan members in contrast, I have to take on the laziest and most incompetent." 
 
On the other hand the employment and training of clan and family members possess 
sometimes a snowball effect, in that able staff members acquire technical knowledge, and are 
then able to make themselves self-employed, sometimes with financial support from an 
entrepreneur. 
 
                                                           
21 Clifford Geerts, Peddlers and Princes (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p.123. 
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Of particular significance is the financing of schools. In counties in which entrepreneurs have 
financed such schools, this achievement was particularly emphasized. Such benefits are 
officially publicized so as to stimulate emulation. In one locality in Ganluo County, an 
entrepreneur from the Jike clan had constructed a large clan school in his native village, 
exclusively populated by members of his lineage; this school bears the name Jike School. 
Members of the Jike clan from other counties traveled there to view the school, above all so 
as to stimulate a copycat effect. 
 
Generally one can discern that there are two groups of donors: amongst the first group 
donations to the community are assessed as symbolic capital, which brings social capital with 
it afterwards i.e. social recognition not only within the clan but also outside it, above all 
amongst the local political elite. As a rule the donors are designated as "Model working 
persons", and obtain seats as members of the People’s Congresses or the People’s 
Consultative Conferences.  
 
One of these donors, a successful entrepreneur in the construction industry in Ganluo County, 
had distinguished himself not only by the building of a school but also by means of financing 
road construction, re-afforestation programs and combating poverty. As a result he was not 
only named as deputy director of the county’s office for water and electricity supply, but also 
given a seat as a member of the National People’s Congresses. This success was rewarded 
commercially too: amongst the managers and "advisers" he had chosen to be employed by his 
firm were four retired people with wide-ranging connections in the county and prefecture: a 
former deputy Party boss of the county, the former head of finance in the county, a former 
bank director, and a highly placed engineer from east China. Symbolic capital can be 
transformed in this way into social capital, and the latter in turn into economic capital. 
 
The second group of donors makes transfers either of money or of goods and services, which 
essentially are not used in any productive way (for their own basic needs and/or the 
overcoming of everyday problems or for ritual purposes). Such benefits are assessed by 
members of the clan as social obligations, and generate social capital within the clan or the 
village, but hardly anything more. It is precisely payments for ritual purposes that are 
important for the position of a person within their clan. Moreover in this way a clan can 
demonstrate its power potential towards the outside. As an example an entrepreneur stated 
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that on the occasion of his mother’s funeral, he had 110 cows slaughtered which promoted his 
prestige not only within the clan but also the clan’s external prestige.    
 
Our interviews showed that it was the financing of unproductive activities which were more 
found to be a burden, but not the subsidizing of community institutions that generates stronger 
symbolic and social capital. The governments of the counties and townships that mostly lack 
the wherewithal for the development of the infrastructure, attempt in particular to encourage 
entrepreneurs to make such donations. The local authorities attempt to promote the role of the 
entrepreneur as an exemplary player in local development. 
 
Moral obligations towards the clan play as they did in the past a meaningful role. Many 
entrepreneurs perceived this thoroughly positively: "The money that we earn is not only our 
own," declared one entrepreneur, "it also belongs to the clan as a social community."22 
 
Here the double role which the entrepreneur plays becomes clear: on the one hand he is a 
member of a kinship network, secondly he is an entrepreneur who has to consider the interests 
of his/her company. Therefore he is not only member of a group (clan) but also a self-
employed entrepreneur who has to survive within the market. With the increasing significance 
of his company’s interest, the clan necessarily has to decline in significance and with it the 
package of traditional values that it represents. This in turn has repercussions on the clan and 
its values generally.  
 
Emile Durkheim suggested that the formation and development of division of labor represents 
an important factor in the context of development processes. The increasing division of labor 
indicates on the one hand that social structures change, on the other hand they lead to new 
forms of social solidarity and social order. The trend is increasingly towards social 
relationships beyond people’s immediate community (clan, village), and they contribute to the 
intermingling of individuals and groups. Phenomena are generated such as markets, 
competition between producers and a specialization of the offer. Mechanical solidarity, 
stamped as it is by a strong collective consciousness starts to decline, communities become 
differentiated. Above all the mobility of the entrepreneur, geographical migration into other 
areas or into cities relaxes social control, and with that the cohesion of the traditional social 
organization. Statements of numerous entrepreneurs that the clan does not play much of a role 
                                                           
22 Discussion in Mianning County, 15 August 1999. 
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for their business activity and tends to represent a burden indicate that the collective 
consciousness has weakened and a process of individualization has set in.  
 
The result of these trends is that organic solidarity comes into being i.e. a division of labor 
more strongly based on specialist and individual organizations and institutions.23 In this 
process of change both commercialization and the role of money play an important role. It is 
above all the possession of money, which brings with it an "expansion of the self". The 
consequence is on the one hand the breaking away from traditional social relationships and 
ties, on the other hand new forms of such relationships and ties come about which relate less 
to the clan and instead to social structures which transcend the clan. Money creates what goes 
beyond the clan i.e. "Larger business /commercial circles with a closer interconnection of 
interests, obligations and dependencies."24 
 
Our interviews demonstrate as well that in the consciousness of many Yi entrepreneurs the 
clan has begun to assume a decreasing social function. Whether the role of the clans is further 
weakened, may well also be connected to the question, to what extent the economic role of 
this social organization declines or increases. Our survey shows that somewhat less than a 
third of the Yi entrepreneurs interviewed have business relations within the clan, more than 
two-thirds (69.1%) do not. That is indeed nothing special in a society in which market events 
and entrepreneurship have up till now played a rather marginal role. But other elements in the 
statements indicate that clan-transcending factors are becoming ever more important for 
entrepreneurs. In respect of their roles as clan members the market brings entrepreneurs into 
the following dilemma: they are obliged to take care of family or clan members with jobs or 
material gifts despite the fact that those people contribute little or nothing to the development 
of the firm. This in turn hinders the company from operating effectively in the market. The 
clan as an ethnic network is insofar disadvantageous for entrepreneurs, and requires a 
minimizing of ethnic solidarity so that entrepreneurs can survive financially.   
                                                           
23 Emile Durkheim, Über soziale Arbeitsteilung (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1992), pp.289-295. 
24 See Georg Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1994), pp.405-410; Klaus Heinemann, 
"Soziologie des Geldes", in: K. Heinemann (ed.), Soziologie wirtschaftlichen, pp. 333, 334. 
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Table 2: Assessment of clan and clan support by Yi entrepreneurs 
• Goals in life: increased support of one's clan    49.4% 
• Burden of the clan as a reason for backwardness 
of Yi entrepreneurs       33.3% 
• If I had a larger amount of money I would support my clan  28.4% 
• Motivation for donations: support of one's clan    18.5% 
• Support by one's clan important for success in business   14.8% 
• Relatives in high positions important for success in business    2.5% 
Source: Own survey. 
 
Table 2 demonstrates that – at least in the minds of many Yi entrepreneurs – the clan plays a 
less important role. The majority does not see supporting their clan as a life goal, and only a 
relatively low percentage expressed a desire to support their clan. As many as a third 
explicitly experienced the burden caused by the social organization as a reason for the 
backwardness of the Yi entrepreneurs. In the interviews too the ambivalent role of the clans in 
the entrepreneurs’ consciousness came to the surface. Numerous entrepreneurs complained 
about the burdensome nature of the clan whereas another group declared that the supportive 
payments for the clan were for them not a burden. Numerous entrepreneurs put forward the 
argument that these payments made them stand out (in a positive sense) from the Han.  
 
Through monetary payments transfers some entrepreneurs tried to purchase freedom from the 
obligation to employ clan members. Clan members, we were told, often did not bother going 
to work, worked badly and brought about problems. Some employers reported that as a result 
they made payments so as not to be "saddled with them".  
 
But even if there were undoubtedly critical voices concerning the function and impact of the 
clan. The Yi scholar Ma Erzi explained in reference to the entrepreneur’s clan-critical 
perception: 
 
The clan has central significance for every individual just as it did before, although an 
entrepreneur may actually argue otherwise. Even if he declares that he does not employ any clan 
members, nevertheless one will find in the administration or the security department clan members 
after all, because only they can be really trusted.25 
 
 
                                                           
25 Discussion with Ma Erzi in Mianning, 17 August 1999. 
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And another entrepreneur expressed the opinion: 
 
Within the clan one has to reach unity, otherwise nothing works any more. In that money does not 
play a decisive role; whether one has money or not, can give a lot or only a little. In the clan we 
are all equal. That even applies to high-up cadres, because they too are clan members.26  
 
This imagined equality was or is something of a fiction, earlier because of the traditional 
social stratification, nowadays through the role of the entrepreneurship as an economic elite. 
But that idea of equality brings about a feeling of an equal right to participate in the activity of 
the clan. This is due to every clan member having a vote at the clan gatherings where difficult 
questions and problems are decided in a process of consultation and discussion. Numerous 
entrepreneurs termed this "grass-roots democracy" and pointed out that (as they saw it) 
democracy has always been an important component of Yi society.  
 
A further factor which, however, I have not researched further, is that of the change in the role 
of female entrepreneurs within their clan community. Through entrepreneurship, the position 
of those women within the clan gradually changes.27 Successful female entrepreneurs become 
more self-confident and increasingly are accepted as independent personalities within the 
clan. An example is that of a female entrepreneur in Jinyang, who explained that until 1978 
Yi women had generally lived a peasant or housewife existence. Since then things have 
changed. The clan had not helped her when she started her business activity, she achieved 
everything through her own efforts. Her clan is anyway much too poor to support her, she 
added. In the meantime it has become a considerable burden for her. She told us that she 
transfers money, clothes and pays for the basic needs and school attendance of a number of 
children. Through her entrepreneurial activity, her prestige within the clan has however 
increased, and people listen to her opinion much more than they had done before. Her horizon 
has also widened. Earlier in her life, she had not even visited the prefecture’s capital Xichang 
once, but she has since those days even traveled to the two most important cities in the 
southwestern provincial capitals Chengdu and Kunming. But generally in the clans the 
prevailing opinion is as it was before that (Yi) women should not take part in business 
activity. Only "bad" women engage in self-employed work or open a restaurant. 
 
                                                           
26 Discussion in Mianning County, 17 August 1999. 
27 More on the change in women’s role during the reform era: Wu Ga, "Nuosu Women’s Economic Role in 
Ninglang, Yunnan, under the Reforms," in: Stevan Harrell (ed.), Perspectives on the Yi of Southwest China 
(Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 2001), pp.256-266. 
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Further social impacts of Yi entrepreneurship 
 
Entrepreneurs as headmen of their clans 
 
Clearly the position of entrepreneurs within their own clan increases in significance if and 
when they are economically successful. Numerous larger entrepreneurs declared that through 
commercial activity their prestige in the clan had increased, and that they have in effect taken 
over the function of clan leader or headman (touren): "If the company works out well, one can 
become touren." 27 out of 81 Yi entrepreneurs, primarily the larger ones, admitted that they 
were accepted as such "leaders" by their clan or lineage members, and that either their opinion 
had a decisive character (shuo le suan), or that in cases in which important decisions are to be 
made by their clan, they were invited to participate in decisions and asked for advice. 
Traditionally, the touren of the Yi clan was (and still is) not an elected person, but he and his 
abilities (intelligence, courage, wisdom and trust) are widely accepted, so that he 
automatically grows into this role and becomes a leading figure.28 
 
But if we compare the traditional functions of clan leaders who were not voted for but instead 
gradually grew into a leadership role on the basis of general acceptance, it can be seen that 
there were in the past two important pre-conditions necessary for that: (a) bravery, courage 
and success in clan feuds; (b) the ability to sort out and mediate efficiently the affairs of the 
clan both internally and externally. Central to this was the ability to handle civil and military 
matters well and successfully. Here a change appears to be looming through social and 
economic transformation: the development into a leadership role due to possessing (a) the 
skills to deal with the clan’s business both internally and externally and (b) economic success 
which contributes to the prosperity of the clan community. 
 
Many entrepreneurs differentiate between the functions of a touren who represents the clan 
towards the outside world and the family manager, who runs the clan almost as a firm and/or 
takes care of its economic development. In some clans the companyization of the clans has 
occurred rather than the clanization of the company. Entrepreneurs with leadership functions 
within a clan appear as a result to take on rather the role of a clan manager than that of the 
traditional touren. This is precisely what the statements of entrepreneurs amount to when they 
                                                           
28 More on the role of the headman: Liu Yu, "Searching for the Heroic Age of the Yi People in Liangshan," in: S. 
Harell (ed.) Perspectives on the Yi, pp.116, 117. 
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declare that while they are not the clan’s leader, in the final analysis they make the crucial 
decisions or are involved in reaching them. 
 
The pre-condition is first of all that an entrepreneur enjoys close connections within the clan. 
For leadership positions those persons suggest themselves who possess prestige inside the 
clan, for instance because their father had earlier been clan leader, or because they are well 
rooted in the clan villages (as the rural entrepreneurs were in Yanyuan County). At the same 
time taking over the clan leader function also depends on whether an entrepreneur has 
contributed to an improvement of the infra-structure in his home village like the construction 
of schools, roads, water pipes, electricity, building of clinics, reforestation programs or the 
erection of TV stations. Almost all Yi entrepreneurs who told us that they exercise leadership 
functions in their clan had – according to their own statements – made appropriate donations 
of goods. Another activity that is prestige laden appears to be assistance in the reduction of 
poverty, to which entrepreneurs can contribute, for instance, through the creation of jobs and 
vocational training. 
 
The growing significance of non-kinship relations 
 
Through the (clan-transcending) cooperation on the part of entrepreneurs, their relationships 
to people in former activities (as cadres, workers, etc.), the significance of friends and 
connections to people with whom they have shared experiences increases, and leads to a 
different set of relationships outside the clan or lineage. As we have shown above, even if the 
clan is still dominant, many entrepreneurs have already put this dominance into question. Not 
a few entrepreneurs argued that friends and other people with non-kinship relations play an 
important role for access to credits or business support. And some even complained that 
beyond the burden of supporting clan members, there was now an additional weight to 
support i.e. friends. Others emphasized the growing role of their village community (insofar 
as such communities are not identical with one’s clan or lineage).  
 
Strong ties 2: Tong Relationships 
 
As a result of all these trends, it appears that the role of clan-transcending networks is 
increasing. This is, for instance, true for the "Tong relationships". Tong (the commonality), is 
the most important basis for social relationships (guanxi). Belonging to the same ethnic 
  21
community is of course a central factor in social and tong relationships. Moreover, the 
tongban (classmate), tongbao (regional compatriot), tonghang (colleagues in a specialized 
field), tongshi (work colleague), tongxiang (town fellowmen from the same village or 
township), tongxue (school colleague) etc. all exist in special relationships to each other (tong 
relationships). Not all people with whom such relationships exist can be included in the 
networks of a private entrepreneur, rather only those to whom close relationships exist and 
who hold important positions (such as manager or cadre), and could be of use to the 
entrepreneur. At the same time tong relationships are based not only on economic advantage, 
but instead on friendship and trust too. Assistance or support of some kind which has been 
completed does not require any direct service in exchange, but is rather to be understood as an 
investment for the future i.e. the reciprocal obligation might later become due, but need not 
necessarily do so anytime. For urban companies, relationships to classmates and former 
colleagues play a more significant roll than for rural firms, for which the familial or village 
relationships carry more weight. The relationships between cadres who shared common 
experiences in the same local Party organizations or Party schools are of much importance. 
 
With the increase of non-kin relationships an important pre-condition comes about for the 
consolidation of the common and shared identity of the Yi as members of an ethnic group 
(and not merely a kin group). Such an identity is in the process of growing, and moreover 
social and economic change as well as migration to some extent all weaken the access of the 
clans, and the delimitation follows ever more ethnically and ever less determined by the clan. 
At the same time the clan gains in having a stronger, social-economic function i.e. family and 
clan members as providers of capital or workers. So a process of economization of the clan 
takes place.  
 
Entrepreneurism makes that process of economization easier as well as the formation of the 
clan-transcending forms of solidarity, because the entrepreneurs understand themselves to be 
no longer only members of the clan but also members of an (imagined) community of Yi 
entrepreneurs. In this way the ethnic group becomes a social space within which solidarity 
can be expected. The new ethnic self-confidence acquired through entrepreneurship, the easier 
access to cash, the acquisition of many new consumer goods, and the development of new 
skills and knowledge also alter the inter-ethnic relationships.  
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Processes of individualization 
 
Individualization is considered to be a crucial factor in processes of modernization and a 
significant part of social change. Interestingly, such a process appears to be emerging. In fact, 
in the answers to our survey we find significant expressions of such a growing 
individualization. 
 
Table 3: Individualistic components of Yi entrepreneurs (%) 
Goals in life: good future for one's own children    86.4 
Importance for commercial success: own abilities    85.2 
Goals in life: happy family      77.8 
Goals in life: higher social prestige      48.2 
Goals in life: individual happiness      43.2 
Primary motivation for founding company: Interest in self-employment 20.0 
Unfavorable decisions of local authorities: I would alter it   19.7 
Source: Own survey. 
 
My interviews demonstrate that increasingly important roles are played by their own company 
and with that (in the entrepreneur’s consciousness) the entrepreneurs themselves (inclusive of 
their own nuclear family). Entrepreneurship requires a more individualistic perception and 
that implies a declining role for larger social frameworks such as clans in the entrepreneur’s 
consciousness, even if entrepreneurs have not as yet been able to withdraw from their 
traditional social obligations. 
 
Summary: entrepreneurs as agents of social change 
 
Traditional strong ties (clan, kinship) possess as they did before central significance for the 
entrepreneur but this is sliding towards post-traditional strong ties (tong relationships). As a 
result one can speak of a gradual change of resources. This process of change intensifies 
social and personal insecurities, and above all amongst young people disorientation and 
deviant behavior are in turn generated amongst them. Where clan communities and traditional 
values are dominant as they were before e.g. in Meigu County, social problems appear to be 
less serious than in those counties where the sense of community has been weakened. 
 
Political or social uncertainties and unpredictability have the effect that the economic 
functions of clan companies have increased. So long as particular services are not made 
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available publicly (e.g. credits), kinship, guanxi and networks serve as referential elements. 
Clan communities attempt to counteract the gradual process of erosion (described above) 
through new forms of organization. On the other hand, the state which for a long time 
struggled against clans,  has discovered their role as an instrument of social order. 
 
The thinking of many Yi entrepreneurs is without a doubt still rooted in the moral economy. 
More markedly than amongst the Han entrepreneurs, economic behavior is bound up for the 
Yi with non-economic relationships and conceptions of social morality i.e. it is not the logic 
of the market which is decisive for them. The market economy is even criticized as causing 
the slackening of social norms. On the other hand the transition from the moral to a market 
economy creates an ambiguous situation: interchange and prestige are decreasingly based on 
local morality, and furthermore goods and relationships become increasingly commercialized. 
Entrepreneurs are forced finally to behave in a market-rational way if they want to survive. 
That this has already been recognized by sections of the entrepreneurs is shown in the 
statements of Yi entrepreneurs that they no longer wanted to employ members of the clan, but 
rather wanted to help clan members out by means of money transfers, donations and material 
support. 
 
At the same time the market creates a new and separate moral and value system. The latter is 
based on economic equality in the market situation in which buyer and seller meet on equal 
terms, and not at all on the subordination of the individual to the group (clan), or 
hierarchization on the basis of age and gender. Such non-economic characteristics can still be 
applied within religious communities, parties and widely varying interest groups (e.g. 
networks or peer-groups). The difference between non-ethnic identity and ethnicity remains, 
however, in that the latter entails separation off from other ethnicities and to the dominant 
ethnicity (Han) in the state government. 
 
Entrepreneurs increasingly become the pacemakers of progress. They are not only the 
representatives of market conditions and technical progress, but also develop into persons 
with significant prestige within their respective clans as well as within their nationality. At the 
same time they do not abandon important elements of Yi culture, and thereby promote their 
maintenance and renewal. Processes of industrialization contribute to the separation of 
economic activities from traditional family activities. Conditions at places of work are 
increasingly impersonal. Clan-transcending frameworks in business and everyday life lead at 
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the same time to both entrepreneurs and sections of their employees no longer thinking only 
in terms of clan structures but rather in clan-transcending categories too; as a result those 
frameworks contribute to a transition from a clan identity to an ethnic identity.  
 
As far as the Yi are concerned, entrepreneurs oscillate between two poles: on the one hand 
they have to open up to the market and ignore non-economic factors, but on the other hand 
they have to observe moral obligations to the community (clan and lineage). The dualism 
entailed in the necessity on the one hand to make profits and on the other a moral obligation 
to share income with the clan community has been called "the trader's dilemma".29 This is a 
result of the embeddedness of the economy in the wider social context, particularly as, in the 
words of Marcel Mauss, "exchange is not simply an economic transaction, but a total social 
phenomenon."30 
 
                                                           
29 Cf. Hans-Dieter Evers, "The trader’s dilemma," in: H.-D. Evers, Heiko Schrader (eds.), The Moral Economy 
of Trade. Ethnicity and Developing Markets (London, New York: Routledge, 1994); Tilman Schiel, "The 
traders’ dilemma," in: H.-D. Evers, H. Schrader (eds.), The Moral Economy, pp. 15-26. 
30 Ibid p.16. 
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